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Abstract:  
A number of recent studies have suggested that activist stabilization policy rules responding 
to inflation and the output gap can attain simultaneously a low and stable rate of inflation as 
well as a high degree of economic stability. The foremost example of such a strategy is the 
policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993). In this paper, I demonstrate that the policy settings 
that would have been suggested by this rule during the 1970s, based on real-time data 
published by the U.S. Commerce Department, do not greatly differ from actual policy during 
this period. To the extent macroeconomic outcomes during this period are considered 
unfavorable, this raises questions regarding the usefulness of this strategy for monetary 
policy. To the extent the Taylor rule is believed to provide a reasonable guide to monetary 
policy, this finding raises questions regarding earlier critiques of monetary policy during the 
1970s. 
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There is widespread agreement that the objective of monetary policy in the United States
over the past several decades has been the pursuit of price stability and maximum sustain-
able growth over time. Recent studies have suggested that activist stabilization policy rules
that respond to inﬂation and the level of economic activity can achieve these objectives and
attain both a low and stable rate of inﬂation as well as a high degree of economic stability.1
A critical aspect that dierentiates these rules from alternative guides to policy, such as
policies that concentrate on inﬂation or stable money and nominal income growth, is the
emphasis they place on the level of economic activity in relation to a concept of the econ-
omy's potential|that is the \output gap" or the related \unemployment gap." A prominent
example of such a strategy is the policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993). Unfortunately, as
a practical matter, the informational requirements of implementing these activist policies,
especially the measurement of the \output gap" or \unemployment gap" present substan-
tial diculties. As a result, activist stabilization strategies that might appear promising
when these diculties are ignored may instead prove counterproductive when implemented
in practice.
This observation is not new. Indeed, it is at the very center of the monetarist criticism
regarding activist control of the economy|the old \monetarists" versus \activists" debate.
At least since the late 1940s, Milton Friedman and later others including Allan Meltzer
and Karl Brunner warned that since the reliable information required to make activist
countercyclical policies useful is not typically available, such policies should be avoided.
Instead, they favored simple policy rules such as a constant rate of money growth which do
not require such concepts as the output gap. (See e.g. Friedman, 1947 and 1968, Brunner,
1985 and Meltzer, 1987.) This debate, needless to say, was not satisfactorily resolved by
the 1970s or even later.
As is well known, macroeconomic policy in the United States during the 1960s and
1970s appeared to have been guided by activist stabilization objectives. The \New Eco-
1Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), McCallum (1999) and Taylor (1998) provide surveys of the recent
monetary policy rules literature. Fischer (1990) reviews earlier contributions.
1nomics" which was arguably introduced in 1961 with the rst Kennedy Council of Economic
Advisers|Walter Heller, Kermit Gordon, and James Tobin|was at rst remarkably suc-
cessful in engineering a period of great prosperity in the Nation.2 But this success did not
last. By the end of the 1960s (especially after Heller, Gordon and Tobin, and the remarkable
economic team they had originally assembled was no longer formulating policy), prosperity
was tempered by worsening inﬂation. Although macroeconomic policymakers apparently
attempted to keep up with the earlier success, and continued to rely for guidance on the
\output gaps" and \unemployment gaps" that had proven useful in the early 1960s, in-
ﬂation became the dominant and worsening problem. Indeed, the Great Inﬂation which
started in the late 1960s and intensied during the 1970s, is generally viewed as one of the
most signicant failures of monetary policy since the founding of the Federal Reserve.3
In light of this experience, it is instructive to examine whether the recently proposed ac-
tivist monetary policy rules that emphasize policy reactions to the level of economic activity
relative to the economy's potential would have provided better guidance to policymakers
during that period relative to the framework that guided policy at the time. A detailed re-
cent evaluation along these lines has been provided by Taylor (1999b). Taylor examined the
policy prescriptions from two baseline rules for the federal funds rate, the rule he proposed
in 1993 and an alternative placing greater emphasis on the output gap. For the 1970s,
Taylor demonstrated that actual policy was systematically easier than what his baseline
rules would have prescribed. He interpreted the results as suggesting that the Taylor rule
would have guided policy away from the inﬂationary policies of the 1970s. Taylor's favor-
able interpretation, however, is based on information that was not available to policymakers
when policy decisions were made. As a result, this analysis merely demonstrates that the
Taylor rule would have avoided the inﬂationary outcomes of the 1970s if policy could be set
with the benet of hindsight. Arguably, this exercise does not adequately address whether
this rule is robust to the informational problems that are at the center of the monetarist
2Tobin (1966, 1972) provides informative reviews of the early debates and the economic outcomes of the
period. Heller, Gordon and Tobin (1961) provide an early outline, and the classic 1962 Economic Report of
the President reviews the original plans, ideas and their rationale.
3De Long (1997), Hetzel (1998) and Meyer (1999) provide extensive analysis and bibliographies. Eckstein
(1978) and Blinder (1979) provide enlightening contemporaneous analyses.
2critique of activist policies.
In this paper, I revisit this issue by examining the policy prescriptions that would
have been suggested by the Taylor rule in real time during the 1970s. To this end, I
rely exclusively on data that were available to the general public, drawing extensively from
publications of the U. S. Commerce Department. The resulting reconstruction of the Taylor
rule suggests that the prescriptions obtained by the rule without the benet of hindsight do
not greatly dier from the actual setting of the federal funds rate during the 1970s. This
outcome suggests that the Taylor rule is perhaps as susceptible to informational problems as
other activist stabilization strategies that attracted criticism from monetarists over the past
half century. The analysis also indicates that policy frameworks such as the Taylor rule,
do not appear to be more \rule-like" than similar policies that others, for example Tobin,
termed \discretionary." Indeed, on the one hand, Taylor (1993) stressed that an element
of discretion is an important part of the rule-based policy framework he proposed. On the
other hand, the description of discretionary policy provided by Tobin (1983) maintains some
of the important attributes of Taylor's rule-like approach.4 It is therefore hard to draw a
clear distinction between \rules" and \discretion" in this case. In the end, my analysis
suggests that the unfavorable macroeconomic outcomes of the 1970s do not fundamentally
reﬂect dierences in the existing framework from Taylor's rule-based framework. Rather,
the analysis identies misperceptions regarding the state of the economy in conjunction
with an activist stabilization objective as the important factors leading to the inﬂationary
experience of the 1970s.
4The following exchange of views, from Wessel (2000), is informative regarding the terminological di-
culty:
James Tobin, a Nobel laureate in the nonrules camp, questions if Mr. Taylor preaches what
he claims to preach: \Starting from the side of the debate opposite to mine, he seems to arrive
at the same place. Follow the spirit, the intent, of a rule, he says, and do not be bound by a
particular quantitative formula." Mr. Taylor responds: \What I would like to do is get rules
to 80% of the decision. That would be enormous progress.
Tobin (1998) provides a detailed exposition of the usefulness of the Taylor-rule framework and its relationship
t oh i so w nv i e w so np o l i c ys t r a t e g y .
32 An Overview of the Taylor Rule
The Taylor rule originated in a collection of studies examining the comparative performance
of alternative simple interest rate policy rules across a variety of dierent models (Bryant,
Hooper and Mann, 1993). A particularly promising rule in those studies prescribed that the
Federal Reserve should set policy so that the deviation of the short-term nominal interest
rate, R, from a baseline equilibrium value, R, respond linearly to the deviation of inﬂation,
 from its desired target, , and to the output gap, y.
R − R = ( − )+y (1)
Taylor (1993) proposed a particular parameterization of this rule that has attracted con-
siderable attention. He set the sum of actual inﬂation and the equilibrium short-term real
interest rate, r,a sap r o x yf o rR, and used the values r =  =2a n d =1 =2. (Through-
out, the interest and inﬂation rates are stated in percent annual rates and the output gap in
percent.) This parameterization attracted attention as a guide to policy decisions because
in addition to its encouraging performance in alternative models, as reported in Bryant,
Hooper and Mann (1993) and several subsequent studies, it also appeared to accurately de-
scribe actual policy decisions in the 1987-1992 period that Taylor had originally examined.
Since monetary policy over this period was considered successful, the conﬂuence of the two
results suggested that the Taylor rule may represent a useful and reliable guide for mone-
tary policy decisions. In recent years, prescriptions from a Taylor rule have been regularly
provided to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members. Further, since January
1998 the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis has published monthly updates of prescriptions
from the Taylor rule in the publication Monetary Trends.
As is well known, despite its apparent simplicity, implementation of the Taylor rule
in practice is not straightforward (see e.g. Orphanides, 1998, 2001). In addition to the
parameters specied above (including the dicult to determine equilibrium real interest
rate), implementation requires an exact denition of the inﬂation and output gap inputs
to the rule. As is common practice in this literature, for his analysis Taylor employed the
latest vintage of historical data available. He used the log dierence in the GDP deﬂator
4over four quarters ending with the current quarter for inﬂation. For the output gap, he
adopted the log dierence between actual real output in the current quarter and a smooth
trend estimate of potential output. An immediate diculty, emphasized by McCallum
(1994), is that rules that rely on within-quarter reactions to data about that quarter are
not operational since the data needed for the rule are not available within the quarter. As
a result, in practice the Taylor rule has been operationalized either by using within-quarter
forecasts or by specifying that policy react to inﬂation and the output gap for the previous
quarter. In model-based policy evaluation studies both approaches have been extensively
examined with similar results. (See e.g. Levin, Wieland and Williams, 1999, and McCallum
and Nelson, 1999.) For policy prescriptions that rely exclusively on data available to the
public, only the latter option applies. For instance, the Taylor rule published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis employs this one-quarter-lag timing. To focus attention on the
Taylor rule as could be applied with data available to the general public I also adopt this
timing below.
A second diculty, emphasized by Orphanides (2001, 2002), is that the data and key as-
sumptions employed to construct the rule change over time. These changes reﬂect a number
of sources, such as conceptual changes in the denitions of actual output, potential out-
put and price indexes, reestimation of historical time series (including seasonal denitions),
incorporation of previously incomplete or unavailable historical data and the evolution of
underlying modeling practices. As a consequence of this diculty, historical examination of
the Taylor rule requires close attention to the vintage of data employed. A reconstruction
based on current data can provide information regarding the setting of a rule that a policy-
maker could have achieved with the benet of hindsight but not regarding the setting of a
rule that could have been actually implemented, nor the setting of a rule that would have
been implemented, had the rule been adopted over history.
Figure 1 provides a birds-eye view of the federal funds rate and the Taylor rule from
1966 to 1998 using \current" data.5 To x notation, for any variable x,l e txijj be the value
5By \current" or \nal" data I mean data available when the snapshot of data used for this analysis was
taken. Of course, \nal" data corresponding to later snapshots will dier. Here, I rely on data as available
5of the variable for quarter i as provided by the relevant agency in quarter j.( I u s e t h e
subscript T to denote the current data vintage.) Let d be the log of the output deﬂator, q
the log of real output and q the log of potential output. For the rule shown in the gure, I
employ the chain-weighted GDP deﬂator as published by the U.S. Commerce Department
and construct the measure of inﬂation used for quarter t as t−1jT = dt−1jT − dt−5jT.T o
construct the output gap, I use the Commerce Department estimates of real GDP and
the potential output estimates published by the Congressional Budget Oce (CBO), both
measured in chain-weighted 1992 dollars.6 The output gap measure for quarter t is then
yt−1jT = qt−1jT − q
t−1jT.
Comparison of the federal funds rate and the Taylor rule shown in gure 1 provides the
basis for the favorable historical assessment of the rule when examined with the benet of
hindsight. Since the late 1980s the rule broadly follows the contours of actual policy. In the
earlier years policy appears to have been systematically easier and more volatile than the
rule in the 1970s and considerably tighter subsequently. The systematic dierence of actual
policy from the rule in the late 1960s and 1970s, in particular, is taken as evidence that had
the rule been followed the Great Inﬂation could have been averted. This nding, in turn,
has been interpreted as indicating that the rule may be robust to the problems that led to
policy errors during the 1970s.
3 A Closer Look at the 1970s
To examine the Taylor rule in a more realistic way for the 1970s, I reconstructed the
prescriptions of the Taylor rule using data as available in each quarter from 1968:4 to 1979:4.
That is, I computed the rule replacing the current inﬂation and gap measures, t−1jT and
yt−1jT in the rule with their equivalent measures available to the public in quarter t, t−1jt
and yt−1jt. The continuing conceptual and denitional changes of the underlying data,
of course, requires greater specicity about the exact data that should be used for this
on October 1999, when I originally put together the dataset for this study.
6These are the same series as employed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis for the Taylor rule
published in the Monetary Trends. Taylor (1999b) relied on a Hodrick-Prescott trend denition for potential
output. This is essentially similar to the CBO series over the historical period relevant for this analysis.
6purpose. The guideline I follow is to use in every quarter published data that would most
closely correspond to the key concepts required for the Taylor rule, that is, the concepts
\real output," \output deﬂator," and \output gap" or \potential output" as were available
and used at the time.
Some details are in order. The headline concept for aggregate output during the 1970s
was GNP instead of the current choice of GDP. Further, instead of the current chain-
weighted concept for the output deﬂator, and associated estimates of real output, a xed-
weight constant-dollar concept was employed at that time. In my sample, the deﬂator
and associated real output were stated in 1958 constant dollars until 1975:4 and in 1972
constant dollars from 1976:1 on. Data for nominal and real output from which one could
construct the output deﬂator inﬂation were published with a one-quarter lag by the Com-
merce Department, for instance, in the monthly publication Survey of Current Business.I
use these data to construct the inﬂation measure t−1jt = dt−1jt−dt−5jt. During this period,
in addition to estimates of actual GNP, an ocial estimate of potential GNP was published
by the government. This series was constructed and updated by the Council of Economic
Advisers. Starting with 1962, these estimates were regularly provided in the Annual Report
of the Council of Economic Advisers which was published with the Economic Report of the
President. (The publication of this ocial series continued until 1981.) From 1968:4 to
1976:4, in particular, the Commerce Department employed these data to publish updated
estimates of actual GNP, potential GNP and the associated output gap in the monthly
publication Business Conditions Digest. (This publication has been discontinued.) I use
the data published there for the latest output gap data available in each quarter t, dened
as yt−1jt = qt−1jt − q
t−1jt. From 1977:1 to 1979:4 I did not nd monthly or quarterly Com-
merce Department publications with estimates of potential output. As a result, for these
three years, I relied on the data presented in the 1977, 1978 and 1979 Economic Report of
the President for estimates of potential output. I constructed rst estimates of the output
gap by combining these estimates with the rst GNP estimates published by the Commerce
Department in the Survey of Current Business.7
7Usage of the ocial series for potential output was quite common during the 1970s. Plots and discussion
7Figure 2 compares the resulting real-time Taylor rule with its current rendition, repro-
duced from gure 1, and the actual setting of the federal funds rate. As can be seen from
this gure, prescriptions implied by the Taylor rule at the time policy decisions were made
appear surprisingly close to actual policy throughout the 1970s. The rule captures quite
accurately the two major policy easing episodes associated with the recessions of 1970 and
1974 and the subsequent policy tightenings. And in stark contrast to the current rendition,
it does not suggest that policy was consistently more expansionary than the Taylor rule.
These ndings cast considerable doubt on the hypothesis that the macroeconomic outcomes
of the 1970s would have been dramatically dierent if policy were set according to the rule,
using information available to the public at the time.8
4 Accounting for the Dierences
The size of the discrepancy between the current and real-time renditions of the Taylor
rule warrants further explanation. Since the dierence can be attributed to discrepancies
between the current and real-time measures of the two inputs to the rule, inﬂation and the
output gap, a detailed accounting of this dierence is immediate.
Figure 3 shows the underlying data for these two variables. The upper panel compares
the two inﬂation measures, t−1jt and t−1jT and shows that these measures dier substan-
tially at times. During the two crucial years preceding the 1974 acceleration of inﬂation, for
instance, the real-time measures consistently understated inﬂation by over one percentage
point, as compared to current estimates. In terms of the Taylor rule which prescribes a
change of one and a half percentage point in the federal funds rate for every percentage
point change in inﬂation, this suggests that the rule prescription in real-time would have
been over 150 basis points lower than the current data suggest for those two years.
Most of the systematic dierence between the current and real-time renditions of the
Taylor tule, however, is due to the dierence between the real-time and current estimates
of the series can even be found in several textbooks published at the time, including Samuelson (1976),
Branson and Litvack (1976), Dornbusch and Fischer (1978) and Meyer (1980).
8A quantitative assessment of how large the dierence in such outcomes might have been had the rule
been followed could be performed with model-based counterfactual simulations. (See e.g. Orphanides, 2000.)
However such comparisons would be dependent on the specication of the model.
8of the output gap, yt−1jt and yt−1jT, shown in the lower panel of gure 3. From the current
perspective, the real-time output gap series for this period appears to have been systemat-
ically biased. This bias, which at the start of the sample in 1969 was about two percentage
points, increased considerably during the early 1970s|exceeding ten percentage points by
1975|before improving towards the end of the 1970s. In terms of the Taylor rule which as-
signs a weight of one-half on the output gap, this suggests that the rule prescription during
the 1970s would have been anywhere from 100 basis points to over 500 basis points lower
than what current data would suggest.
Mismeasurement of the output gap can be attributed to either mismeasurement of the
level of actual output or the level of potential output. Attempting an exact decomposition of
these errors into these two sources can be quite involved. Figure 4 provides some indicative
estimates for the contribution of actual output mismeasurement to these errors. The upper
panel compares the quarterly growth rates of real output with current data, (qt−1jT−qt−2jT),
to their real-time counterparts, (qt−1jt − qt−2jt). (These estimates are in percent quarterly
rates.) As is evident, dierences in these growth rates can at times exceed one percent. On
their own, these one-quarter errors do not appear that unusual. However, this obscures a
potentially important problem associated with the measurement of the level of a variable
such as output. An accumulation of even small errors in the growth rates could, at times,
generate an error of several percentage points in the measurement of the level. Compare,
for instance, the cumulative output growth for the previous three years as seen in 1975:1,
(q1974:4j1975:1−q1971:4j1975:1), with the growth over the same period as seen with current data,
(q1974:4jT − q1971:4jT). Using the current data suggests that relative to the 1971:4 baseline,
output in 1974:4 was three percentage points higher than using the real-time data. This
disparity provides a measure of the mismeasurement of the level of output but only a rough
measure because it depends on how reliable the comparison of the baseline quarter (here
1971:4) would be. The lower panel of gure 4 repeats these calculations for every quarter
in the sample. The resulting cumulative discrepancy in the level of real output is shown
for two horizons, two and three years, to show how the results change with alternative
9baselines. That is, in each quarter, t, the plot shows:
(qt−1jT − qt−1−kjT) − (qt−1jt − qt−1−kjt)
for k = 8 (two-year horizon) and k = 12 (three-year horizon). These cumulative errors
suggest that the measurement of real output was too pessimistic following both the 1970
and 1974 recessions and could account for a signicant portion of the mismeasurement of
the output gap. The worst errors, in 1975, coincide with the worst errors in the output gap
measures shown in gure 3 and can account for as much as ve percentage points of the
output gap mismeasurement that year.
This illustrates that mismeasurement of the level of actual output was a signicant con-
tributing factor to the mismeasurement of economic activity in the 1970s. But a substantial
and highly persistent discrepancy between the real-time and current estimates of the output
gap still remains. This must be attributed to estimates of potential output that proved, in
retrospect, to have been too optimistic. Indeed, a major problem with the real-time output
gap estimates in the early 1970s, is that they were based on estimates of potential output
which were shaped by the extraordinary performance of the economy during the 1950s and
1960s. In this sample, potential output was projected to grow at an annual rate of 4 percent
until the end of 1969, an estimate that was raised to 4.3 percent in 1970. Based on current
data and the experience of the past thirty years, this may appear very optimistic. The aver-
age growth of real output from 1970 to 1998 was 2.8 percent per year. However, growth from
1950 to 1969 averaged 4.2 percent per year and at the time it was believed that potential
output growth had accelerated somewhat in the late 1960s. The deterioration in economic
growth we now identify with the \productivity slowdown," which had already started in the
late 1960s, was not recognized until considerably later. Potential output growth estimates
were revised downward in the 1970s, to 4 percent in 1974, 3.75 percent in 1976, 3.5 percent
in 1977 and 3 percent in 1979. But for the whole decade, these revisions lagged behind the
reduction in potential output growth implicit in current estimates as constructed with the
benet of hindsight.
Another factor contributing to the mismeasurement of the output gap during the early
101970s, was an implicit assumption at the beginning of the decade that the natural rate
of unemployment was four percent. But following the experience of unexpectedly high
unemployment and inﬂation, especially during 1974 and 1975, this assumption was also
brought into question and revised upwards, to 4.9 in 1977 and 5.1 in 1979. By contrast, the
current CBO estimate for that time is about six percent or higher.9
Okun's law (Okun, 1962) provides a rule of thumb for the extent of mismeasurement of
the output gap associated with such incorrect estimates of the natural rate. According to
this law, as was applied at the time, the output gap was believed to be roughly equal to
three times the unemployment gap. (More recently this same relationship is being applied
with a lower coecient, e.g. 2{2.5.) Thus, if the natural rate assumption in the early 1970s
was 2 percentage points too optimistic, Okun's law would suggest that potential output
estimates could be about 6 percentage points too optimistic as well.10
5 The Evolution of Beliefs, Policy, and Inﬂation
In retrospect, it is clear that mistaken beliefs regarding potential output growth and the
natural rate of unemployment at the start of the 1970s, coupled with a slow pace of ad-
justment of these beliefs in the face of a continuing deterioration in the nation's productive
capacity prospects, resulted in estimates of the level of potential output and the output
gap that were consistently too optimistic during the 1970s. A pertinent question is whether
policymakers did or should have considered the ocial estimates of the output gap overly
optimistic in real time. Based on information available at the time, in the early 1970s it
was not evident that the ocial estimates should have been controversial.11 As Peter Clark
9With the 1982 recession, the uncertainty of these estimates became even higher, and point estimates
also rose, as reﬂected in Tobin (1983): \Unfortunately no one knows what the NAIRU is. Current estimates
for the United States vary from 8 percent to 5 percent" (p. 512).
10Although potential output was not constructed using Okun's law, it was inﬂuenced by the baseline
assumption that the economy was at potential in mid 1955 with unemployment near four percent and stable
prices. Consequently, using deviations of unemployment from four percent and Okun's law was considered
a useful rough guide for the output gap.
11Robert Solow (1982) provides an enlightening analysis of what went wrong with the Council's original
estimates of potential output. His account attributes most of the error to the unexpected unfavorable shift
in trend productivity that started in the 1960s. Evidence documenting the unreliability of end-of-sample
business cycle estimates, e.g. Christiano and Fitzgerald (1999) and Orphanides and van Norden (2002)
suggests that mistakes of this nature are largely unavoidable.
11observed in 1979:12
\Research on potential GNP from 1964 to 1974 produced a number of dierent
views on the best estimation technique, but very little disagreement about the
estimates themselves. All the results were similar to the CEA estimates or even
somewhat higher." (p. 141.)
Although the nexus of inﬂation, output and unemployment from 1970 to 1972 was consid-
ered somewhat puzzling, it was the surprising acceleration of inﬂation in 1973|while output
was still well below potential and unemployment substantially higher than four percent|
that prompted a reexamination of the earlier estimates.13 In January 1974 the Council
of Economic Advisers acknowledged increased uncertainty regarding estimates of potential
output and revised downward earlier estimates of both the level and growth rate of potential
output. The energy crisis and associated recession which spanned 1974 and continued into
early 1975, made it extremely dicult to separate any further changes in the underlying
trend of potential output from cyclical developments during these two years. The estimate
of potential output growth was then revised downward in early 1976 and a major eort to
revamp the historical estimates of potential output was initiated that year which resulted
in the major revision evident in the data in January 1977. The 1977 revision reduced the
estimate of potential output for 1976 by 4 percentage points and brought the spectacular
gap for 1975Q2 (which was rst reported to be about 15 percent) down to 10 percent.14
In retrospect, even these revised gures from the late 1970s appear overly optimistic when
compared to current estimates. However, at the time this was not at all clear and one could
even reasonably argue that the Council revisions were too pessimistic.15 Estimates used
at the time by professional forecasting groups such as Data Resources Incorporated and
12Clark's views are particularly useful as his work during 1976 resulted in the major improvement in the
ocial estimates of potential output which was published in 1977.
13As shown in Figure 3, this inﬂation acceleration appeared much sharper in real time due to the pattern
of mismeasurement in inﬂation in these years. In retrospect, of course, this is not at all puzzling, considering
the severe overheating of the economy in 1973 depicted in the current data in the bottom panel of the gure.
14By 1979, the gap for 1975Q2 was further revised downwards, closer to 8 percent, and kept shrinking
with subsequent revisions.
15See e.g. Perry (1977) and the discussion following his article for a range of views and estimates spanning
the Council's revisions.
12Wharton Econometrics were not dramatically dierent either.16
Whether any of these revisions should have been carried out earlier or should have
been anticipated by policymakers remains a dicult question. It is indeed possible that
policymakers anticipated some of these revisions before their ocial publication. For a
revision as large as the one published in 1977, in particular, some of the change may have
been anticipated prior to the ocial release of the new estimates. Returning to gure 2, it
is interesting to note that based on the published real-time data, the setting of the federal
funds rate prior to this revision, during 1976, was consistently about two hundred basis
points higher than the Taylor rule. This policy is equivalent to a setting of the Taylor rule
with an output gap estimate that is four percentage points lower than the ocial estimates
published in 1976|exactly the revision for 1976 reﬂected in the 1977 estimates of potential
output. Thus, during 1976, actual policy was consistent with the Taylor rule adjusting for
the large subsequent revision in potential output that was published in January 1977.
To conrm whether misperceptions regarding the output gap actually inﬂuenced the
monetary policy process, it is useful to examine direct evidence from the deliberations of
the FOMC. An enlightening example appears in the FOMC Memorandum of Discussion
for the contentious August 18, 1970, meeting. This was in the context of the series of
easings that had started in February to counteract the recession underway. The August
meeting was important in that by then real activity had stopped deteriorating and the
sta was forecasting a modest expansion.17 The record shows that close to the end of the
meeting the committee was evenly split, with six members (including the Chairman) voting
in favor of a directive calling for additional easing and six members voting in favor of an
alternative that would have essentially maintained an unchanged policy stance. Members
opposing further easing pointed to the need to concentrate on reducing inﬂation which had
fallen in the second quarter but was still over four percent. However, other members were
16For example, in the introduction to his book on \The Great Recession," which was completed in 1976,
DRI's Otto Eckstein observed that \[b]y the trough of the recession in the spring of 1975, real GNP had
fallen 14.5% below the full employment path" (p. 1)
17Data for the second quarter which had become available in the inter-meeting period indicated real GNP
had grown by 0.5 percent as compared to the 5.4 percent drop in the rst quarter. Figure 5 presents historical
data and forecasts of inﬂation and output (as well as the ocial estimate of potential) as available at the
meeting.
13concerned that the level of economic activity was not improving fast enough and at the end
of the meeting an easing was adopted. Referring to the sta forecasts of GNP, a governor
is reported to have explained the need for this easing by noting that: \If those projections
were realized, however, the gap between actual and potential real GNP would be between
5.5 and 6 per cent by the second quarter of 1971. In his judgment, that was not satisfactory
as a goal of policy." (p. 45.) Indeed, these projections proved quite accurate|based on
the ocial estimates of potential output available at the time. But in retrospect, these
projected gaps appear spectacularly o the mark.18
The record for the meeting also indicates that committee members were in agreement
that policy should continue to aim towards reducing inﬂation. Given the perceived slack in
economic activity, however, easing policy was not considered inconsistent with this objective
by the majority. As stated in the policy directive (adopted with three dissenting votes),
\... it is the policy of the Federal Open Market Committee to foster nancial conditions
conducive to orderly reduction in the rate of inﬂation, while encouraging the resumption
of sustainable economic growth." (p. 66). Indeed, from the perspective of the Taylor rule,
the policy adopted during that meeting was consistent with the long-run inﬂation target of
two percent that is implicit in the rule|conditioning on the ocial output gap estimates
available at the time.
Incorrect assessment of the economy's potential inﬂuenced the sta's advice to the
Committee as well. During 1975, when these misperceptions appeared to be at their worst,
the sta suggested that a policy of further easing could be pursued with little concern about
inﬂation, despite the high degree of monetary accommodation that was already in place. At
the May 1975 meeting, for example, the sta argued that \... there is such a large amount
of slack in the economy now that real growth would have to exceed our projection by a wide
margin, and for an extended period, before excess aggregate demand once again emerged
as a signicant problem." (FOMC Memorandum of Discussion, May 1975, p. 26). And
18The reference to projected output gaps also indicates awareness of the need to be \forward-looking" in
setting policy. Indeed, the policy discussions suggest that throughout this period, decisions were greatly
inﬂuenced by the projected outlook for inﬂation and economic activity. Orphanides (2002, 2003) conrms
that estimated policy rules based on Federal Reserve Board sta forecasts can be used to characterize these
policy decisions.
14further, \[s]imulations using the econometric model suggested that a considerably faster
rate of expansion could be stimulated without having a signicant eect on the rate of
increase in prices|that a considerably more rapid rate of increase in real GNP would still
be consistent with a further winding down of inﬂationary pressures" (p. 27). In the event,
the FOMC did not pursue a policy of greater accommodation, and yet inﬂation outcomes
for the rest of 1975 and for 1976 were worse than anticipated by the sta. The incorrect
assessments of the economy's potential at the time, of course, inﬂuenced the forecasting
process, and inﬂation forecasts also proved too optimistic.
To be sure, this evidence does not imply that FOMC policy during the 1970s literally
\followed" the Taylor rule. What it does indicate is that policy was inﬂuenced by the
same considerations as are embedded in the Taylor rule, namely deviations of inﬂation
from the Federal Reserve's low inﬂation objective, and deviations of economic activity
from perceptions of the economy's sustainable economic growth path. Furthermore, it
illustrates that because of the emphasis the rule places on the concept of the \gap," the rule
itself becomes susceptible to the exact same problems apparent in the activist discretionary
stabilization strategy pursued during the 1970s.
The fact that actual policy during the 1970s does not greatly dier from the Taylor rule
as could be implemented in real time also suggests that examining the implications of fol-
lowing the rule in the presence of misperceptions regarding potential output|or the related
concept of the natural rate of unemployment|could potentially be useful for understanding
the acceleration of inﬂation during the early 1970s. A rule of thumb on how much of the
inﬂation pickup could be attributed to mismeasurement of the output gap with the Taylor
rule can be derived by determining the steady state of inﬂation compatible with a constant
level of mismeasurement in the rule. From equation (1), in steady state (−)+y =0 ,s o
any perceived persistent output gap would exactly balance a persistent deviation of inﬂation
from its target. For example, an inﬂation rate of eight percent, instead of the two percent
target in the rule, could be consistent with a persistent six percentage point error in the
output gap or, using Okun's law as described earlier, a two percentage point misperception
15of the natural rate of unemployment. To the extent the Taylor rule is believed to provide
a reasonable guide to monetary policy, an inﬂationary outcome such as this should not be
entirely unexpected as errors of this nature simply reﬂect the ignorance associated with
real-time assessments of the economy's potential.
Key policy gures later admitted that a mistake of this nature|if not exact magnitude|
had indeed been committed. Shortly after leaving the Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns (1979)
pointed to the delay in recognizing the increase in the natural rate and the productivity
slowdown in the late 1960s and 1970s as two major factors for the inﬂationary outcomes
of the period. Herbert Stein, who served as member and later chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisers during the Nixon administration, identied the belief that the nat-
ural rate was four percent and its implications for inﬂation \the most serious error of the
Nixon CEA" (p. 19). As he explained: \fascinated by the idea of `the natural rate of
unemployment,' which we thought to be 4 percent, we thought it necessary only to let the
unemployment rate rise slightly above that to hold down inﬂation." (p. 19-20.)19
6 Conclusion
Activist stabilization policies require prompt and accurate assessments of the level of eco-
nomic activity in relation to a concept of the economy's potential. As a practical matter,
considerable uncertainty frequently obscures the current state of the economy and renders
measures such as the \output gap" and the \unemployment gap" highly unreliable in real
time. Although policies that rely on these measures may appear promising in the absence
of these diculties, such policies can easily prove counterproductive in practice. This paper
uses the inﬂationary experience of the 1970s as a laboratory to show that recently proposed
monetary policy rules that react to such \gaps" are as susceptible to these diculties as
earlier discretionary policies guided by similarly activist objectives.
To be sure, this does not diminish the appeal or the importance of rule-based or rule-
19To their credit and unlike many other economists at the time, Burns and Stein had already subscribed
to Friedman's (1968) natural rate view by the end of the 1960s. As a result, they avoided the additional
problems associated with the perception of a long-run tradeo between inﬂation and unemployment. Sargent
(1999) demonstrates the inﬂationary consequences of policy driven by such perceptions.
16like policy. But it does point to the desirability of examining more robust alternatives to
policies emphasizing \gaps" for policy design. Also, the unfavorable outcomes of the pursuit
of gap-based policies cannot be necessarily seen as evidence favoring the monetary growth
targeting approach proposed by monetarists at the other end of the debate. The diculties
experienced in the early 1980s with the various variants of M1 as well as the questions about
M2 in the early 1990s suggest that, although they can be very useful at times, monetary
growth targeting strategies are far from an ideal solution, and that they also would require
modications and discretion in practice.
The middle ground, perhaps, could be in the direction of strategies that concentrate
neither on gaps, nor on money growth targeting, but on a common objective related to
both, the stability of growth in the economy, and nominal income. Tobin emphasized this
middle ground during the 1980s, when diculties at both ends of the activist-monetarist
debate were better understood.
\I will state my view very bluntly. The long-run targets of the Federal Reserve
should be expressed as a path of nominal GNP ...
These targets should take precedence over any short-run instrument targets for
monetary aggregates or interest rates. It should be made clear that both the
Fed's instruments and those intermediate targets will be varied so as to keep
nominal GNP on track|not of course month to month or quarter to quarter
but on average year to year." (Tobin 1981, 1987, p. 373)
\For two years ahead, the intermediate target should be nominal GNP growth ...
This would indicate how the policymakers would allow price and productivity
shocks to aect output and employment, while allowing complete freedom to
oset velocity-of-money surprises with money supplies. Indeed, the Fed might
advertise this target as a velocity-adjusted monetary aggregate ..." (Tobin 1983,
516)
Other economists during the 1980s, including some who had earlier been more optimistic
about the usefulness of \output gaps" and \unemployment gaps" as guides, also suggested
moving to this middle ground. For example, Arthur Okun agreed that \[policymakers] do
not serve the nation well if they concentrate on output and employment targets|whether
the objective is set forth as achieving full employment, the natural unemployment rate, or
potential GNP" (1981, p. 354). Rather, he concluded, an ecient macroeconomic strategy
17could be designed based on \adoption of the objective of growth in nominal GNP" (p.
357). From the other end of the debate, in a careful examination of the usefulness and
limitations of money growth targeting strategies, McCallum (1985) also concluded that
\an intermediate target strategy could more fruitfully be based on the path of nominal
GNP than of the money stock" (p. 591). Concentrating on nominal income for guiding
policy appeared to evolve into a strategy with many proponents seeking to balance the
desire for reasonable economic performance against the temptation of excessive activism.
Commenting on McCallum (1985) Tobin characteristically remarked: \Let us rejoice that
views are converging" (1985, p. 607).
With our limited knowledge of the workings of the economy, we can never be certain that
we have successfully identied the best approach for stabilization policies. We can only hope
that by seeking guidance from the past, especially understanding the underlying problems
that likely led to earlier mistakes, we can avoid repeating the most glaring of such mistakes
going forward. The recently proposed policy rules that emphasize a gap-based approach to
monetary policy seem to capture the essence of the stabilization approach that was in place
during the 1960s and 1970s. With correct readings of the state of the economy such policies
may be successful. However, the 1970s provide a striking example when such strategies
were much less successful. To the extent the macroeconomic outcomes of the 1970s are not
considered particularly favorable, the usefulness of such monetary policy rules as guides for
monetary policy decisions ought to be carefully examined.
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22Figure 1
Federal Funds Rate and Taylor Rule with Current Data
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Notes: The solid and dashed vertical lines represent NBER business cycle peaks and troughs,
respectively.
23Figure 2
The Taylor Rule with Real-Time and Current Data
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Notes: The real-time rule is based on information as available in quarter t based on rst
published data for quarter t − 1. The current rule is based on current estimates of the
historical data for the corresponding quarter. See also notes to gure 1.
24Figure 3
Underlying Current and Real-Time Data
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Notes: Inﬂation is the log change in the output deﬂator over four quarters ending with t−1,
in percent. The output gap is the log dierence between real output and potential output,
in quarter t − 1, in percent. See also notes to gures 1 and 2.
25Figure 4
Real Output Mismeasurement
Real Output Growth
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Notes: Real output growth is the quarterly change in real output for quarter t−1, in percent.
The cumulative discrepancies show the dierence in estimates of real output growth between
current and real-time data over the horizons shown ending in quarter t−1, in percent. See
also notes to gures 1 and 2.
26Figure 5
The Economic Outlook at the August 1970 FOMC Meeting
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Notes: Inﬂation is the log change in the output deﬂator from the previous quarter, in
percent annual rate. Output is actual GNP (solid line) and the ocial estimate of potential
GNP (dashed line) for the quarter shown, measured in an annual rate with constant 1958
dollars. The vertical line in 1970Q2 indicates the last quarter of historical data. The dotted
lines represent Greenbook forecasts.
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